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Double Tax is Double the Trouble: The 
Solution?  
Moving Toward a System of Corporate 
Integration 
SKYLER SANTOMARTINO*© 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States tax system traditionally imposes a double tax on corporate in-
come, whereby corporate income is taxed at both the corporate level and the indi-
vidual level. The double tax, while recently modified by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017, is inherently problematic because it tends to influence the way corpora-
tions—and people for that matter—invest their money. In an ideal world, the tax 
system should strive to be neutral. That is, it should neither encourage nor discour-
age certain investment decisions. Rather, investment decisions should be made on 
the basis of their economic merit, and their economic merit alone. Tax neutrality 
has been the principle focus of tax policy for quite some time, which is why tax 
policymakers continue to advocate for the integration of corporate taxes. Corpo-
rate integration supports the principle of tax neutrality by reducing or eliminating 
the disparities between favored and disfavored investment decisions. For this rea-
son, corporate integration should be at the forefront of future tax reform regimes.  
Section I of this paper will discuss the double tax on corporate income and ex-
plain the particular economic disparities that the double tax creates. Section II will 
examine corporate integration and detail the history of proposals to integrate the 
corporate tax. Finally, Section III will explore the viability of various corporate inte-
gration models while proposing that at least one of those models should be 
adopted.  
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I. THE “DOUBLE TAX” ON CORPORATE INCOME 
A.  An Overview 
In the United States, C corporations1 are subject to a “double tax,” whereby corpo-
rate income is taxed initially at the corporate level and then again at the individual 
level when income is distributed to shareholders as dividends.2 Effectively, share-
holders pay “taxes twice on the same income—once as [owners of the corporation] 
and again as part of their personal income tax.”3 Corporations, however, were not 
always taxed in this manner. In fact, history reveals that the double tax was neither 
“properly evaluated or devised” nor “designed to achieve the most efficient or eq-
uitable means to tax corporate income.”4 
Initially, only certain corporations were taxed.5 Although these corporations did 
pay taxes on dividends and interest payments, shareholders were able to deduct 
payments already made by the corporation from their personal incomes.6 Accord-
ingly, taxes on dividends and interest payments acted not as a separate tax on cor-
porations but as a withholding tax.7 Indeed, subsequent iterations of the corporate 
tax “lent credence to the withholding interpretation” by requiring that undistrib-
uted corporate profits be taxed to shareholders.8 Because shareholders paid taxes 
on all corporate income, regardless of whether or not the income was distributed, 
the corporate tax was effectively “integrated” with the individual tax.9   
Later, Congress imposed a direct two percent tax on corporate income pursuant 
to the Tariff Act of 1894 (“the 1894 Act”).10 The 1894 Act also ensured that individ-
ual income would be taxed at the same rate.11 Importantly, however, shareholders 
were able to exclude from their taxable income dividends received from 
 
 1. C corporations are named after the corresponding subchapter of the Internal Revenue Code. See gen-
erally 26 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2012).  
 2. TAX POL’Y CTR., Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
briefing-book/corporate-income-double-taxed. 
 3. Daniel E. Palmer, Double Taxation, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/double-
taxation. 
 4. Meredith R. Conway, Stealth Inequity: Using Corporate Integration to Ease Unfairness in the Tax Code, 
2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 53, 62 (2010).  
 5. Marjorie Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L. J. 
53, 83 (1990). Specifically, only corporations “of a public nature such as those engaged in banking or transpor-
tation” were required to pay taxes. Id.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 84. The Act of June 30, 1864 “included in an individual’s income ‘the gains and profits of all com-
panies, whether incorporated or partnership . . . .’” Id.   
 9. Id.  
 10. See Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894).  
 11. See id. § 27, at 553.  
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corporations that had already paid the two percent tax.12 As a result, the corporate 
tax continued to be integrated with the individual tax.  
After the Supreme Court ruled that the 1894 Act’s income tax provisions were 
unconstitutional,13 individual income all but escaped taxation. However, Congress 
“revived the corporate income tax concept” in 1909, when it adopted a federal ex-
cise tax on corporations (“the 1909 Act”).14 Although the 1909 Act was designed as 
a means for reaching individual income (and in particular, the income of wealthy 
shareholders), it “was never a threat to impose double taxation because … an indi-
vidual income tax did not accompany the corporate tax.”15 Therefore, while the cor-
porate excise tax acted in some respects as a “substitute for the individual income 
tax,”16 the excise tax was actually a tax upon “the privilege of doing business in the 
corporate form.”17  
The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 1913,18 allowing Congress to reinstate 
the individual income tax along with the corporate income tax with the passage of 
Tariff Act of 1913 (“the 1913 Act”).19 Under the 1913 Act, individual income was 
taxed at a flat rate of one percent (the “normal tax”).20 However, income that 
reached certain levels were taxed a second time at progressive rates (the “sur-
tax”).21 Also, corporate income was taxed at a flat rate that expressly mirrored the 
normal tax rate.22 Because the 1913 Act excluded dividends from the normal tax 
but not the surtax, corporate income was potentially subject to two levels of tax 
(the corporate level tax plus the applicable surtax after distribution).23 Ultimately, 
the 1913 Act served as the precursor to the modern double tax.  
 
 12. See Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 86–87. 
 13. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the individual income tax in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 
wherein the Court decided that a direct income tax violated the constitutional requirement that all “direct” 
taxes be apportioned between the states according to their respective populations. 157 U.S. 429, 580 (1895).  
 14. Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends – Evidence from History, 56 TAX 
L. REV. 463, 478 (2003).  
 15. Id. at 478–79.  
 16. Id. at 478.  
 17. Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporate Income Tax Act of 1909, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclope-
dia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/corporate-income-tax-act-1909 (last updated 
Nov. 1, 2019). See also Conway, supra note 4 at, 53, 62–63 (stating that “the separate corporate income tax 
was justified because corporations received various legal protections due to their classification as a separate 
entity. The corporate income tax thus served as a tax on the benefit of limited liability.”). 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  
 19. See generally Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-72 (1913). 
 20. Id. at 166. 
 21. Id. The highest tax rate under the Tariff Act of 1913 was 6 percent. Id.  
 22. See Id. at 172 (“The normal tax hereinbefore imposed upon individuals likewise shall be levied, as-
sessed, and paid … to every corporation . . . .”).  
 23. Id. at 167.  
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The 1913 Act was viewed as an “imperfect withholding tax on a shareholder’s 
portion of corporate profits.”24 Specifically, it allowed Congress to tax shareholder 
wealth in addition to the individual income tax and in lieu of the individual income 
tax in “cases where it was being evaded.”25 There were, however, concerns “that 
corporations would become tax avoidance vehicles for high income shareholders” 
by retaining earnings instead of distributing them as dividends (where earnings 
were subject to the higher individual surtax rates).26 Therefore, in an effort to reach 
more retained earnings through the corporate income tax, Congress raised the cor-
porate tax rate substantially.27 By 1936, Congress imposed a maximum corporate 
tax rate of fifteen percent and also removed the normal tax exemption for distrib-
uted dividends.28 Consequently, corporate income was subject to two full layers of 
tax while “income from other sources was only subject to one layer of tax.”29   
Despite subsequent changes to the corporate tax rate and the taxation of divi-
dends, the double tax on corporate income has largely remained in place.30 Clearly, 
the rationale behind the adoption of the double tax—grounded on the premise that 
the corporate tax is a tax upon the “privilege of doing business” as a corporation—
is no longer uniquely applicable to the corporate form.31 Indeed, the advent of lim-
ited liability companies, limited partnerships, and S corporations have allowed a va-
riety of businesses to hold massive amounts of investor wealth while limiting inves-
tor liability. Even so, corporations continue to be assessed an extraordinarily high 
tax burden via the double tax.  
B. The Economic Impact of Double Taxation 
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”),32 the United 
States boasted the highest combined33 corporate tax rate among all Organisation 
 
 24. Conway, supra note 4, at 63. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Bank, supra note 4, at 490. 
 27. Id. at 505. 
 28. Id. at 513–14. By that time, the normal tax rate had increased to 4 percent. Id. at 513.  
 29. Id. at 514.  
 30. Beginning in 1954, dividends were taxed at ordinary rates with an initial amount being exempt from 
taxation. A Brief History of Dividend Tax Rates, DIVIDEND.COM (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.divi-
dend.com/taxes/a-brief-history-of-dividend-tax-rates/. By 1985, however, dividends were fully taxable to 
shareholders as ordinary income. Id. It was not until 2003 that dividends were first subject to long-term capital 
gains rates, which is the methodology used under the current tax system. Bank, supra note 4, at 465 n.11. 
 31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
 32. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reduced the corporate income tax 
rate from thirty-five percent to twenty-one percent. Id. at 2096. 
 33. The combined corporate income tax rate is essentially the federal corporate income tax rate plus the 
average of state corporate income tax rates. See Kyle Pomerleau, The United States’ Corporate Income Tax Rate 
is Now More in Line with Those Levied by Other Major Nations, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://taxfounda-
tion.org/us-corporate-income-tax-more-competitive/. 
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for Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”)34 countries at that time.35 
However, after the TCJA reduced the corporate tax rate from thirty-five percent to 
twenty-one percent, the combined corporate tax rate dropped substantially, plac-
ing the United States closer to the OECD average.36 
 By lowering the federal corporate tax rate, Congress clearly intended to influ-
ence economic decision-making, albeit indirectly. Taxes impact decisions regarding 
both the amount of money people are willing to invest and how people to invest 
their money.37 Low corporate tax rates simultaneously reduce the motivation for 
corporations to relocate abroad and incentivize domestic investment.38 Additional 
investment lowers the cost of capital, thereby leading to more output, employ-
ment, and higher wages over a period of time.39 Nevertheless, the corporate tax is 
fundamentally flawed because it exacerbates the disparities between favored and 
disfavored investment decisions: (1) debt versus equity finance, (2) corporate ver-
sus noncorporate forms, and (3) retained earnings versus distributions. 
The double tax encourages corporations to invest in debt rather than equity, 
thereby  distorting the choice between debt and equity finance.40 Specifically, eq-
uity-financed investments are taxed twice—at both the corporate level and the 
shareholder level. For example, suppose that an investor provides capital to a cor-
poration with one shareholder. If the corporation earns a $1,000 return on the in-
vestment, that income is subject to a twenty-one percent tax at the corporate level, 
or $210. The corporation is then left with $790 in after-tax profits, which are taxed 
again at the individual level when the corporation distributes these earnings as div-
idends. Assuming a twenty percent individual tax rate for qualified dividend income, 
the shareholder must pay $158 in taxes, reducing the total after-tax income to 
$632.  
Conversely, debt-financed investments are generally not taxed twice. Because 
corporations are able to deduct from their taxable income interest payments they 
 
 34. The OECD, or Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, is an international think tank 
comprised of thirty-six member nations that support free market economics. Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/o/oecd.asp (last updated Apr. 3, 2019). It functions to “publish[ ] economic reports, statistical databases, 
analyses and forecasts on the outlook of economic growth worldwide.” Id. 
 35. Erica York, The Benefits of Cutting the Corporate Income Tax Rate, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://taxfoundation.org/benefits-of-a-corporate-tax-cut/. The combined corporate income tax rate for the 
United States in 2017 was 38.91 percent. Table II.1. Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate, OECD, 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=78166. 
 36. The current combined corporate income tax rate for the United States is 25.89 percent. Table II.1. 
Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate, OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=78166. 
 37. York, supra note 35. 
 38. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., Is Corporate Integration a Good Idea?, TAX NOTES: STAR FORUM (June 20, 2016) 
(available at https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/corporation-integration-good-idea). 
 39. York, supra note 35. 
 40. Pomerleau, supra note 33. 
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make to lenders, the corporate tax does not apply to that portion of the return that 
is paid back as interest (the interest payment, however, is taxable to the lender as 
interest income). For example, suppose that the corporation above issues a corpo-
rate bond and recoups a $1,000 return on the investment. Assuming that the cor-
poration pays $1,000 in interest, the corporation is able deduct the interest pay-
ment from its taxable income. As a result, the corporation owes no corporate 
income tax. Because of this differential tax treatment, corporations are more likely 
to finance through debt rather than equity.41  
The double tax also encourages investment in noncorporate entities rather than 
corporations, thereby distorting the allocation of capital between corporate and 
noncorporate forms.42 Unlike traditional corporations, noncorporate entities such 
as partnerships, limited liability companies, and S corporations are not taxed at the 
entity level.43 Instead, profits are “passed through” to the owners or members who 
 
 41. Id. The distortion between debt and equity is especially relevant today, considering the current United 
States debt crisis. Student loan debt has tripled within the last decade, totaling $1.6 trillion, Gillian Tett, Amer-
ica’s Debt-Laden Students Need Better Policy Solutions, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/3e7e1b9c-cfda-11e9-99a4-b5ded7a7fe3f, outstanding auto loan debt has skyrocketed to nearly $1.3 tril-
lion, Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, As Auto Lending Delinquencies Rise, Discrimination is Even More Dangerous 
to the Economy, FORBES (May 1, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezval-
ladares/2019/05/01/as-auto-lending-delinquencies-rise-discrimination-is-even-more-dangerous-to-the-econ-
omy/#318a34f270e3, and total credit card debt is at its “highest point ever,” exceeding $1 trillion. Jessica Dick-
ler, Consumer Debt Hits $4 Trillion, CNBC (Feb. 21, 2019, 8:28 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2019/02/21/consumer-debt-hits-4-trillion.html. In addition to the roughly $4 trillion in total consumer debt, 
total corporate debt is approximately $15.5 trillion—seventy-four percent of the nation’s GDP. Mayra Rodriguez 
Valladares, U.S. Corporate Debt Continues to Rise as do Problem Leveraged Loans, FORBES (July 25, 2019, 2:38 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2019/ 
07/25/u-s-corporate-debt-continues-to-rise-as-do-problem-leveraged-loans/#191a501e3596. Commentators 
have warned that these massive increases in both consumer and corporate debt, fueled in part by artificially 
low interest rates, John Mauldin, Opinion: When the U.S. Falls into a Recession, a Credit Bubble will Explode, 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 20, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://www. 
marketwatch.com/story/when-the-us-falls-into-a-recession-a-credit-bubble-will-explode-2019-03-20, and a 
surge in bank lending, Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, U.S. Corporate Debt Continues to Rise as do Problem Lever-
aged Loans, FORBES (July 25, 2019, 2:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
mayrarodriguezvalladares/2019/07/25/u-s-corporate-debt-continues-to-rise-as-do-problem-leveraged-
loans/#191a501e3596, have created a ‘credit bubble’ reminiscent of the housing market bubble prior to the 
2008 financial crisis. Reshma Kapadia, Sheila Bair Sees the Seeds of Another Financial Crisis, BARRON’S (Mar. 1, 
2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/sheila-bair-sees-the-seeds-of-another-financial-crisis-
1519916556. Indeed, many economists fear that another economic recession is imminent. See Jonnelle Marte, 
3 out of 4 Economists Predict a U.S. Recession by 2021, Survey Finds, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2019, 5:40 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/out-economists-predict-us-recession-by-survey-
finds/ (“Most economists believe that the United States will tip into recession by 2021, a new survey shows . . . 
.”). Considering the foregoing, there can be little doubt that the double tax system’s distortion of debt and 
equity financing contributes to the proliferation of debt in America.  
 42. Emil M. Sunley, Corporate Integration: An Economic Perspective, 47 TAX L. REV. 621, 635 (1992).  
 43. Note, however, that publicly-traded partnerships are treated as corporations for federal tax purposes, 
unless certain requirements are met. See generally Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7704.  
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pay the individual income tax. As a result, noncorporate entities receive a higher 
rate of return on investment. Consider a corporation that earns a $1,000 return on 
investment. Like the example above, the corporation must pay a twenty-one per-
cent tax at the corporate level, or $210. The remainder is distributed to the corpo-
ration’s sole shareholder, who pays $118.50 in taxes at the individual level.44 The 
total after-tax income pursuant to this transaction is $671.50. Next, consider a lim-
ited liability company that earns the same return on investment. The $1,000 return 
is passed through to its sole member, who pays a twenty-two percent tax at the 
individual level, or $220. Here, the total after-tax income is $780, which is a higher 
rate of return.45 Because the marginal rate of return is, for the most part, higher for 
noncorporate investment than it is for corporate investment, capital is largely mis-
allocated between the two business forms.46 
Finally, the double tax encourages corporations to retain corporate income ra-
ther than distribute it, thereby distorting the choice between retaining and distrib-
uting earnings.47 Tax policymakers ultimately disagree about whether changes in 
the way dividends are taxed affect corporate distribution policies.48 However, the 
double tax on corporate income should generally encourage corporations to retain 
earnings “because leaving the earnings in the corporation allows them to grow sub-
ject to only one level of taxation, [thereby] avoiding the second dividend level 
tax.”49  
Ultimately, these economic disparities illustrate that particular economic activi-
ties are taxed at higher rates than others. Because particular segments of the econ-
omy are taxed at higher rates, corporations and individuals are likely to make deci-
sions “based on tax considerations, rather than the economic merits,” which leads 
 
 44. Here, assume that the shareholder is subject to a fifteen percent rate for qualified dividend income. 
The tax rate on qualified dividends for individuals whose ordinary income is taxed at 22 percent, twenty-four 
percent, or thirty-two percent is fifteen percent. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 131 Stat. at 2057–58. 
 45. In this simplified example, there is one instance in which the rate of return for a corporate entity ex-
ceeds that for a noncorporate entity – when the individual tax rate is thirty-seven percent, and the correspond-
ing capital gains rate is twenty percent. Of course, this caveat holds true only when the income at issue is subject 
to the favorable capital gains rate.   
 46. Pomerleau, supra note 33. Indeed, business activity in the United States has largely shifted to pass-
through businesses over the past three decades. Scott Greenberg, Corporate Integration: An Important Com-
ponent of Tax Reform, TAX FOUND. (April 20, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/corporate-integration-important-
component-tax-reform/. Pass through business activity accounted for only twenty percent of total business 
income in 1980; however, that activity accounted for sixty-four percent of total business income in 2012. Id. 
The rise in pass through business activity ultimately coincides with an overall decline in the number of C corpo-
rations in the United States, which has “fallen to a historically low level.” William McBride, America’s Shrinking 
Corporate Sector, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/america-s-shrinking-corporate-sector/. 
 47. Sunley, supra note 42, at 635. 
 48. See Conway, supra note 4, at (comparing traditional and modern views with regard to the effect of 
taxes on distribution and retention policies).   
 49. Id. at 68.  
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to economic inefficiency.50 This type of economic decision making works counterin-
tuitively to the guiding principle of tax neutrality, which holds that “a tax system 
should neither encourage nor discourage specific economic decisions.”51 Therefore, 
tax reform efforts aimed at restoring parity within the tax system should focus on 
eliminating or, in other words, “integrating” the double tax on corporate income.52  
II.  CORPORATE INTEGRATION, GENERALLY 
A. What is Corporate Integration? 
The double tax arbitrarily imposes a higher tax burden on a single category of busi-
ness income—income that is earned by corporations and distributed to sharehold-
ers.53 As a result, corporations bear a higher tax burden than noncorporate entities 
and corporate shareholders bear a higher tax burden than corporate bondholders.54 
The double tax, along with the economic disparities that it creates, can be reduced 
or eliminated altogether through corporate integration, which generally refers to 
any method that standardizes “the taxation of business income across business 
forms and methods of financing.”55  
There are two overarching models for corporate integration: full integration and 
partial integration. Full integration is grounded on the premise that corporate in-
come should be “taxed only once … at the shareholder level whether or not the 
income is distributed.”56 In essence, the full integration model purports to tax 
shareholders on both corporate distributions and retained earnings, like a pass-
through tax. A fully-integrated corporate tax would likely achieve the goals of cor-
porate integration. Shareholders would be effectively treated as partners for tax 
purposes, meaning that “the current level of taxes would not hinge on whether or 
not the income was distributed.”57 Rather, all corporate income would be taxed 
once at the individual level. Therefore, full integration wholly eliminates the dispar-
ities between debt and equity, the corporate and noncorporate forms, and retained 
earnings and distributions.58  
 
 50. Greenberg, supra note 46. 
 51. Id.  
 52. See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 38 (explaining that the elimination of the double tax would remove 
economic distortions that favor debt over equity financing, noncorporate over corporate investment, and re-
taining earnings over dividends).   
 53. See supra Section I(B).  
 54. See supra Section I(B).  
 55. Greenberg, supra note 46. 
 56. Sunley, supra note 42, at 625. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id.  
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However, the administrative difficulties associated with the installation of such 
a fully-integrated system likely renders the adoption of the full integration model 
unfeasible. For example, “allocating earnings among various classes of stock” and 
discerning “[c]hains of corporate ownership” would add unneeded complexity to 
the tax system.59 Even though similar issues already exist under partnership rules, 
such issues would be significantly exacerbated in the corporate context.60 Thus, the 
only viable means of corporate integration is partial integration.  
Partial integration can be achieved in a variety of ways. One method of partial 
integration is the “dividends-paid deduction,” which proposes that a corporation 
receives a deduction for dividends paid to its shareholders who then pay tax on the 
dividend income they receive.61 A second method of partial integration is the 
“credit imputation,” which requires that a corporation and its shareholders both 
pay taxes on their respective income, but allows shareholders to receive either a 
full or partial refundable tax credit to offset taxes already paid at the corporate 
level.62 The final notable method of partial integration is the “dividend exclusion,” 
which proposes that corporate income be taxed at the corporate level and then tax 
exempt when passed to shareholders as dividends.63 
Each option for partial integration purports to tax corporate income only once, 
either at the shareholder or the corporate level. The dividends-paid deduction 
would place the burden of the corporate income tax at the shareholder level, be-
cause it would allow corporations to deduct distributions. Conversely, the credit 
imputation method would place the tax burden at the corporate level, because it 
would grant shareholders a refundable tax credit for taxes already paid. Im-
portantly, however, credit imputation ensures that corporate income is taxed at the 
marginal tax rate of the shareholder, whether or not the individual rate is higher or 
lower than the corporate rate.64  
Assume, for example, that a corporation earns a profit of $1,000. After the cor-
poration pays its corporate income tax of $210 (twenty-one percent), the corpora-
tion is left with an after-tax profit of $790, which it distributes to its sole share-
holder. Under the credit imputation system, the shareholder grosses-up the 
dividend by adding $210 back to their taxable dividend income. If the shareholder 
faces a marginal tax rate of fifteen percent for qualified dividend income, the share-
holder’s tentative tax is $150. However, the shareholder is also granted a refunda-
ble tax credit, which reduces their tax liability by the amount the corporation al-
ready paid—$210. Because the amount of the tax credit exceeds the shareholder’s 
 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Pomerleau, supra note 33. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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tentative tax liability, the difference ($60) is refunded. Thus, the total marginal tax 
rate on the $1,000 in corporate income is fifteen percent, or $150 (the $210 corpo-
rate tax minus the $60 tax refund), which is equivalent to the shareholder’s mar-
ginal rate. Alternatively, assume that the shareholder above faces a thirty-two per-
cent tax rate for ordinary dividend income. The shareholder’s tentative tax becomes 
$320 after grossing-up the dividend, but the shareholder also receives a tax credit 
of $210—the amount already paid by the corporation. Because the shareholder’s 
tentative tax liability exceeds the amount of the tax credit, no refund is granted. 
Instead, the shareholder’s tax liability is reduced by the amount of the tax credit. As 
a result, the shareholder’s total tax liability is equal to $110 (the $320 tentative tax 
minus the $210 tax credit), and the shareholder’s after-tax income is equal to $680 
(the $790 dividend minus the $110 shareholder tax). The total marginal tax rate on 
the $1,000 in corporate income is now thirty-two percent, or $320 (the $1,000 in 
corporate income minus the $680 in after-tax income), which is, again, equivalent 
to the shareholder’s marginal rate.  
Like the credit imputation method, the dividend exclusion would place the bur-
den of the corporate income tax at the corporate level, because dividends are 
simply excluded from taxation. Unlike credit imputation, however, the total tax on 
corporate income under the dividend exclusion is equal to the corporate income 
tax rate. 
The dividends-paid deduction, credit imputation, and dividend exclusion are all 
viable methods of partial integration. In fact, tax policymakers have proposed at 
one point or another that the United States incorporate at least one of these models 
into its tax system.65 
B. Integration Proposals in the United States  
Corporate integration is not a novel concept to tax policymakers. In fact, there have 
been multiple proposals to integrate corporate taxes over the years. In the mid-
1980s, the U.S. Treasury Department (the “Treasury”) issued two reports assessing 
the viability of incorporating an integration scheme into the corporate tax system 
(“Treasury I”66 and “Treasury II”67 respectively). Pursuant to Treasury I, the Treasury 
recommended that the U.S. “continue to levy the corporate income tax on earnings 
that are retained, but provide partial relief from double taxation of dividends [by 
allowing] corporations to deduct a portion of the dividends paid out of previously-
 
 65. See infra Section II(B).  
 66. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth (1984) (available 
at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Tax-Reform-v1-1984.pdf) (here-
inafter referred to as “Treasury I”). 
 67. The White House, The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity 
(1985) (available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Reform-Pro-
posal-1985.pdf) (hereinafter referred to as “Treasury II”). 
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taxed earnings.”68 In essence, the Treasury proposed that the U.S. adopt the divi-
dends-paid deduction model for partial integration. In justifying its proposal, the 
Treasury cited to various “undesirable effects” with regard to the double taxation 
of corporate income, including encouraging “corporations to rely too heavily on 
debt rather than equity finance,” discouraging corporate investment, and inducing 
corporations “to retain earnings[ ] rather than pay them out as dividends.”69 Nota-
bly, these are the same economic disparities discussed in Section I supra.  
Further, the Treasury expressly rejected adopting a full integration model, citing 
“[t]echnical difficulties” that “preclude the adoption of this approach.”70 It also re-
jected a credit imputation model for similar reasons, describing the dividends-paid 
deduction as “[t]he simpler method.”71 Importantly, the dividends-paid deduction 
would subject shareholders to a “compensatory withholding tax, equivalent to the 
reduction in tax at the corporate level.”72 This means that rather than shareholders 
paying taxes on dividends they receive, the shareholders’ portion of the taxes are 
instead “withheld from the dividend proceeds … at the time the funds are distrib-
uted.”73 The Treasury noted, however, that while dividend relief would remedy the 
economic biases of the double tax, revenue loss would be a consequential con-
cern.74 Therefore, the Treasury suggested that a dividends-paid deduction would 
have to allow corporations to deduct only fifty percent of dividends paid, instead of 
the full amount.75 
Treasury II also recommended that the U.S. adopt a dividends-paid deduction 
model for reasons similar to those explained in the Treasury I report.76 A key dis-
tinction between the reports, however, is that Treasury II endorsed a ten percent 
corporate deduction for dividends paid, rather than a fifty percent deduction.77 
Again, revenue concerns were at the forefront of this decision.78 Despite the pro-
posed limitations on dividend relief, it is clear that both Treasury I and Treasury II 
 
 68. Treasury I at xiv.  
 69. Id. at 118.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 119.  
 73. Tax Reform: Corporate Tax Integration and Philanthropy – a Deeper Dive, COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., 
https://www.cof.org/page/tax-reform-corporate-tax-integration-and-philanthropy-deeper-dive. 
 74. Treasury I at 119. Revenue loss is, in fact, a fundamental concern with regard to corporate integration 
proposals; thus, as discussed in Section III infra, it is important that future proposals incorporate measures to 
hedge against this potential loss. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See Treasury II at 121–22.  
 77. Id.  
 78. See Treasury II, Summary at 7 (iterating the importance of maintaining revenue neutrality when con-
sidering tax reform proposals).  
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sought to move at least some of the tax liability for corporate income to corporate 
shareholders. 
A variety of integration proposals followed Treasury I and Treasury II, but despite 
the best efforts of tax policymakers, no proposal has been successfully adopted.79 
More recently, the Senate Finance Committee held hearings on May 17, 201680 and 
May 24, 201681 to consider then-Senate Finance Committee Chairman Senator Or-
rin Hatch’s proposal to integrate the corporate tax. Senator Hatch, a well-known 
proponent of corporate integration, recommended that the U.S. adopt a dividends-
paid deduction, which would allow corporations to deduct dividends paid to share-
holders.82 Like the proposals set forth in the Treasury I and Treasury II reports, Sen-
ator Hatch’s proposal purported that corporations should withhold taxes at the cor-
porate rate on dividends distributed.83 Importantly, however, his proposal differed 
substantially from the Treasury’s reports with regard to the maintenance of reve-
nue neutrality. Treasury I and Treasury II hedged against the loss of tax revenue by 
recommending that the corporate dividend deduction be limited to fifty percent 
and ten percent of dividends paid, respectively.84 By contrast, Senator Hatch sug-
gested that revenue loss could best be avoided by subjecting tax-exempt sharehold-
ers—such as nonprofit organizations and retirement plans—to the corporate with-
holding tax.85 In effect, Senator Hatch’s proposal would amount to a direct tax on 
dividend income received by previously tax-exempt shareholders, which obviously 
raised a variety of public policy concerns.86 To alleviate these concerns, Senator 
Hatch emphasized that under the classic double tax system, “tax-exempt sharehold-
ers already bear [at least some of] the burden of the corporate level of tax” because 
corporate earnings are taxed at the corporate rate, regardless of whether or not 
 
 79. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems (1992) 
(available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Integration-1992.pdf); 
U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Comprehensive Tax Reform for 2015 and Beyond (2014) (available at https://www.fi-
nance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Comprehensive%20Tax%20Reform%20for% 202015%20and%20Be-
yond%20(C).pdf). 
 80. Integrating the Corporate and Individual Tax Systems: The Dividends Paid Deduction Considered: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 114th Cong. (2016).  
 81. Debt Versus Equity: Corporate Integration Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
114th Cong. (2016).  
 82. Alexandrea Minkovich, Corporate Integration: Chairman Hatch’s Straightforward Approach to Tax Re-
form, 68 TAX EXECUTIVE 41, 42 (2016). 
 83. Id.  
 84. See supra notes 75, 77 and accompanying text.  
 85. Integrating the Corporate and Individual Tax Systems: The Dividends Paid Deduction Considered: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 114th Cong. 7 (2016) (statement of Michael J. Graetz, Professor of Tax Law, 
Columbia University). 
 86. See Integrating the Corporate and Individual Tax Systems: The Dividends Paid Deduction Considered: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 114th Cong. 11 (2016) (statement of Steven A. Rosenthal, Senior Fel-
low, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center) (emphasizing that imposing withholding taxes on tax-exempt share-
holders would be “challenging politically”). 
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the income is distributed.87 Thus, the dividends-paid deduction model would merely 
“make more transparent how much tax tax-exempt shareholders are already sub-
ject to.”88 Moreover, commentators have stressed that “if tax-exempt shareholders 
are not subject to a withholding tax in a [dividends-paid deduction] system, the [tax] 
base is too small and the tax rate too low for corporate integration to avoid losing 
revenue.”89 
Indeed, the share of U.S. corporate stock held in taxable accounts has declined 
substantially over the past fifty years.90 Steven M. Rosenthal and Lydia S. Austin of 
the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center estimated that in 1965, taxable accounts 
held 83.6% of corporate stock,91 but that by 2015, that number had dropped signif-
icantly to 24.2%, or $5.5 trillion, of the $25.8 trillion in total corporate stock.92 Of 
the 75.8% of corporate stock held by non-taxable accounts in 2015, roughly 4.9% 
came from nonprofit ownership,93 thirty-seven percent came from ownership by 
retirement accounts,94 twenty-six percent came from ownership by non-taxable 
foreigners,95 and the remainder came from other non-taxable sources. Because ap-
proximately three-fourths of corporate earnings avoid taxation at the shareholder 
level under the traditional double tax system, it is important that integration pro-
posals (and specifically, those that place the corporate tax burden on corporate 
shareholders) properly account for potential revenue deficits. As Senator Hatch rec-
ognized, the revenue losses associated with the dividends-paid deduction can be 
mitigated or avoided entirely by expanding the corporate tax base—that is, by sub-
jecting tax-exempt shareholders to the corporate withholding tax.96 Despite sup-
port from tax policymakers, Senator Hatch ultimately failed to introduce legislative 
language detailing his proposal for corporate integration before he resigned from 
the United States Senate in early 2019.97 Even so, Senator Hatch’s proposal, along 
with previous corporate integration proposals, set the groundwork for viable inte-
gration legislation.  
 
 87. Minkovich, supra note 82, at 42. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 44.  
 90. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. Corporate Stock, TAX NOTES: 
SPECIAL REPORT (May 16, 2016) (available at https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
publications/dwindling-taxable-share-us-corporate-stock/full). 
 91. Id. at 923.  
 92. Id. at 930.  
 93. Id. at 927. 
 94. Id. at 928.  
 95. Id.  
 96. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 97. See generally, Integrating the Corporate and Individual Tax Systems: The Dividends Paid Deduction Con-
sidered: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 114th Cong. 7 (2016); Debt Versus Equity: Corporate Integra-
tion Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 114th Cong. (2016). 
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III.  ASSESSING THE VIABILITY OF CORPORATE INTEGRATION STRATEGIES  
A. The Dividends-Paid Deduction  
As explained in Section II(A) supra, the dividends-paid deduction model would allow 
a corporation to receive either a full or partial deduction for dividends it distributes 
to shareholders. The corporation would act as a withholding vehicle, meaning that 
the taxes owed by shareholders are withheld by the corporation at the time of dis-
tribution. As a result, distributions are taxed at the shareholder rate, and although 
taxes are collected at the corporate level, the burden of the corporate income tax 
largely rests with the shareholders.  
On its face, the dividends-paid deduction would reduce or eliminate the three 
economic disparities inherent to the double tax. The bias in favor of debt finance 
would be reduced because the dividends-paid deduction allows a corporation to 
deduct both dividends and interest payments, subjecting each to only one level of 
tax at the shareholder (or bondholder) level.98 The bias favoring noncorporate in-
vestment would be reduced for similar reasons; specifically, because all capital 
would be taxed once, whether or not said capital was allocated toward corporate 
or noncorporate purposes. Finally, the bias in favor of retaining earnings would be 
eliminated because earnings would be taxed either once at the corporate level (if 
retained), or once at the shareholder level (if distributed). There is room to ques-
tion, however, whether the dividends-paid deduction model would create an oppo-
site bias favoring the distribution of earnings. If the corporate tax rate exceeds the 
individual rate, as is the case under the TCJA, corporations may be incentivized to 
increase dividend payments—at the expense of retaining earnings that would oth-
erwise be used finance corporate growth—to lower the effective tax rate on corpo-
rate income.99 
Coupling the incentive to distribute earnings with the fact that three-fourths of 
corporate distributions go untaxed at the shareholder level,100 it is clear that a sig-
nificant portion of corporate income under the dividends-paid deduction model 
would avoid taxation entirely.101 Therefore, to prevent potentially significant losses 
 
 98. Notably, the dividends-paid deduction would not entirely eliminate the distortion between debt and 
equity, because “interest is deductible as it accrues while dividends are deductible only when paid.” U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems (1992) 107 (available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Integration-1992.pdf). 
 99. Minkovich, supra note 82, at 44–45. 
 100. See supra Section II(B), regarding the allocation of corporate stock between taxable and tax-exempt 
shareholders.  
 101. The corporate income tax is currently the nation’s third-largest source of federal tax revenue, compris-
ing approximately six percent of all federal tax revenue in 2018. Policy Basics: Where do Federal Tax Revenues 
Come From?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-
where-do-federal-tax-revenues-come-from (last updated June 20, 2019). Under the dividends-paid deduction 
model, all corporate income that is earned and subsequently distributed will avoid taxation at the corporate 
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in tax revenue, integration strategies incorporating the dividend-paid distribution 
must seek to apportion “the tax burden from the missing revenue among the tax-
payers that should properly bear the tax burden.”102 That is, the corporate tax bur-
den must be apportioned among all corporate shareholders, whether taxable or 
tax-exempt.  
In his 2016 integration proposal, Senator Hatch recommended that the corpo-
rate withholding tax apply to tax-exempt shareholders.103 While this is a necessary 
component of any viable dividends-paid deduction scheme, other economic varia-
bles must be considered. Specifically, if tax-exempt shareholders are taxed on in-
come from corporate investment, these shareholders will likely invest more heavily 
in noncorporate businesses, where their returns on investment are still tax-exempt. 
Likewise, if tax-exempt shareholders are taxed only on equity investment, these 
shareholders will probably invest more heavily in debt, where interest payments 
can be received tax-free. Thus, to retain tax neutrality, a dividends-paid deduction 
proposal must ensure that all income received by tax-exempt shareholders is sub-
ject to at least one level of tax, whether that income is derived from corporations 
or noncorporate entities, or equity or debt finance.104  
Considering the foregoing, achieving viable integration via the dividends-paid 
deduction may require a comprehensive reworking of the Internal Revenue Code. 
As a result, the corporate income tax—particularly as it applies to tax-exempt share-
holders—would bear little resemblance to the tax under current law. Because other 
integration models place the burden of the corporate tax at the corporate, rather 
than the shareholder level, these models do not require modification of the tax 
treatment of tax-exempt shareholders. Therefore, the more feasible models for cor-
porate integration are the credit imputation and dividend exclusion.  
B. Credit Imputation  
The credit imputation model would require that a corporation and its shareholders 
each pay taxes on their respective income, but would allow shareholders a tax 
credit to offset taxes already paid at the corporate level. The tax credit would be 
refundable for taxable shareholders but nonrefundable for tax-exempt 
 
level, and much of this income will avoid taxation at the shareholder level. As a result, less corporate income 
tax will be collected, significantly reducing an important source of federal tax revenue.   
 102. Conway, supra note 4, at 103. 
 103. See supra Section II(B).  
 104. Conway, supra note 4, at 103. Tax-exempt organizations are subject to an unrelated business income 
tax (“UBIT”) “on income derived from a business that is unrelated to the entity’s exempt purpose.”  Sunley, 
supra note 42, at 629 n. 49. Under current law, many forms of passive income (e.g. dividends, interest income, 
and capital gains) are not treated as UBIT. Julia Kagan, Unrelated Business Taxable Income (UBTI), INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/ubti.asp (last updated Dec. 11, 2019). However, under the dividends-
paid deduction model, parity could be achieved if income derived from interest payments and dividends were 
“treated in the same manner as UBIT income.” Sunley, supra note 42, at 629 n.49.  
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shareholders. As a result, the burden of the corporate income tax is placed at the 
corporate level, although distributed income is ultimately taxed at the sharehold-
ers’ marginal tax rate. Importantly, because the tax credit would be nonrefundable 
for tax-exempt shareholders, corporate income distributed to such shareholders 
will have already been fully taxed at the corporate level.105  
Generally, the credit imputation model would reduce or eliminate the three eco-
nomic disparities that integration intends to address. Under the traditional system 
of double taxation, interest payments are effectively taxed once at the shareholder 
level because corporations may deduct the amount of the interest payment. Simi-
larly, credit imputation ensures that dividend distributions are also taxed once at 
the corporate level, but at the marginal rate of the shareholder. As a result, both 
equity and debt would be taxed at the shareholder’s rate under the credit imputa-
tion model, eliminating the bias in favor of debt finance. For the same reasons, 
credit imputation would also eliminate the bias favoring noncorporate investment. 
Lastly, the bias in favor of retaining earnings would be eliminated, because corpo-
rate earnings would be subject to tax at the corporate level, whether or not the 
earnings are retained or distributed.106 
It is necessary, however, to consider corporate distributions to tax-exempt 
shareholders when assessing the viability of any integration proposal. Pursuant to 
the double tax system, tax-exempt shareholders (or in this case, bondholders) who 
receive interest payments from a corporation are not required to pay tax on the 
interest income, and the corporation is permitted to deduct the amount of the pay-
ment. In this scenario, corporate income generated from the issuance of debt 
largely escapes taxation. Conversely, under the credit imputation model’s nonre-
fundable credit scheme, returns on equity that are subsequently distributed to tax-
exempt shareholders are fully taxed at the corporate level. In this regard, corpora-
tions may actually be likely to favor traditional debt finance over equity finance. To 
resolve this conundrum, a credit imputation strategy cannot merely remove the 
corporate deduction for interest payments. Doing so would ensure that interest 
paid to tax-exempt bondholders is taxed once at the corporate level; however, it 
would also ensure that interest paid to taxable bondholders is taxed twice (at both 
the corporate level and the bondholder level), exacerbating the disparity between 
 
 105. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems (1992) 95 (available 
at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Integration-1992.pdf). 
 106. Note that credit imputation could, like the dividends-paid deduction, encourage corporations to dis-
tribute earnings that would have otherwise been retained, for the purpose of lowering the tax rate on corporate 
income. However, the effects of this phenomenon are more pronounced under the dividends-paid deduction, 
since corporate earnings distributed to tax-exempt shareholders would escape taxation entirely. By contrast, 
the credit imputation model ensures that corporate earnings distributed as dividends to tax-exempt sharehold-
ers are taxed at least once.   
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debt and equity.107 Thus, in addition to disallowing a corporate level deduction for 
interest, the credit imputation model would have to incorporate a bondholder 
credit imputation scheme.108 
Pursuant to this approach, the corporate-level tax paid on corporate earnings 
distributed as interest payments or dividends “would be passed through to bond-
holders and shareholders as imputation credits.”109 The interest and dividend pay-
ments would be included in the income of bondholders and shareholders who could 
then use tax credits to offset the taxes on such payments.110 Like the ordinary credit 
imputation model, tax credits extended to tax-exempt bondholders and sharehold-
ers would be nonrefundable, ensuring that both debt and equity are taxed once at 
the corporate level.111 
C. Dividend Exclusion  
The dividend exclusion model would require that a corporation pay corporate tax 
on income it receives but would allow shareholders to exclude dividend distribu-
tions from their gross income. Because the shareholder-level tax on dividends paid 
from fully-taxed corporate income would be eliminated entirely, the burden of the 
corporate income tax is placed primarily at the corporate level.  
The dividend exclusion model would also reduce or eliminate the three eco-
nomic distortions of the traditional double tax system. Because the dividend exclu-
sion removes the shareholder-level tax, the total tax on distributed earnings would 
be equivalent to the corporate rate. As a result, the disparities between debt and 
equity finance and between noncorporate and corporate investment would be re-
duced. Moreover, since corporate income would be taxed fully at the corporate 
rate, regardless of whether or not such income is retained or distributed, the divi-
dend exclusion model eliminates the disparity between retaining and distributing 
corporate earnings.112  
Like the credit imputation model the dividend exclusion model must sufficiently 
address corporate distributions to tax-exempt bondholders. As discussed in Section 
III(B) supra, corporate returns generated from debt finance largely escape taxation 
because a corporation may deduct interest payments to tax-exempt bondholders 
who pay no tax on the interest income they receive. To remedy this blatant 
 
 107. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems (1992) 105 (availa-
ble at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Integration-1992.pdf). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Unlike the dividends-paid deduction and credit imputation models, which, to some extent, encourage 
the distribution of dividends for the purpose of subjecting corporate income to a marginally-lower rate, no such 
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disparity, a viable dividend exclusion strategy must both remove the corporate-
level deduction for interest payments and extend a bondholder-level exclusion to 
interest income received. By doing so, the dividend exclusion option would subject 
interest income, like dividend income, to one level of tax at the corporate level.  
D.  Which Integration Strategy is the Most Viable?  
Considering the modified credit imputation and dividend exclusion models above, 
it is clear that the dividend exclusion strategy is relatively straightforward and easier 
to implement. Although both models achieve similar results economically, the 
credit imputation strategy adds additional complexity by requiring the adoption of 
an entirely new regime for taxing corporate distributions. By contrast, the dividend 
exclusion model applies principles that already exist under the current tax system, 
such as taking away deductions and providing exclusions. Ultimately, the modified 
dividend exclusion approach could be the most viable method of integrating the 
corporate income tax.  
CONCLUSION 
The double tax creates economic disparities that favor particular economic activi-
ties over others and encourages individuals to make economic decisions based on 
taxes rather than on the economic merits. By standardizing the taxation of corpo-
rate income through corporate integration, the United States can move closer to-
ward achieving a more economically efficient system. Not all integration proposals 
are treated equally, however. The dividends-paid deduction model, while appealing 
on its face, is unworkable in effect. The credit imputation model, while more feasi-
ble than the dividends-paid deduction method, adds unnecessary complexity to the 
treatment of corporate distributions. Thus, if corporate integration is ever to be 
achieved, tax policymakers should adopt a modified dividend exclusion model.  
 
